In a context of spiralling health care costs and rising demand pressures, many countries are facing increasing demands for collaboration within the primary health care sector. Since the early 1990s, a variety of models of partnerships in primary care have been introduced such as local health care co-operatives in Scotland (Secretary of State for Health, 1997a) , primary care trusts in England (Secretary of State for Health, 1997b) , local health groups in Wales (Secretary of State for Wales, 1998), divisions of general practice in Australia (Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1992) and primary health organisations in New Zealand (Ministry of Health, 2001) . These partnerships in primary care are considered to be a condition to achieve other health care system goals such as continuity of care, quality improvement, equity, and cost containment.
Some of these partnerships in primary care were inspired by early managed care models developed in the United States, whereas others were established in an ad hoc fashion to fit the existing features of national health care systems. Partnerships generally share a number of common features, including enhanced co-operation between primary care providers; support provided by the partnership to participating practices in, for example, practice management, enhanced coordination of administration and budgets across practices, and, in some cases, some degree of collaboration between primary and secondary care providers.
However, models of partnerships in primary care vary across countries and may differ in terms of the type of organisation (public or private), professional membership (voluntary or compulsory), purchasing power (range of services that the organisation can purchase), governance arrangements (type and membership of boards), extent of consumer participation, and degree of accountability. For instance, whereas English primary care trusts have been assigned budgetary responsibility for purchasing secondary services and their membership is compulsory, Scottish local health care co-operatives do not have commissioning power and are based on voluntary membership. The breadth of partnership also varies, with Australian divisions of general practice and primary health organisations in New Zealand strengthening collaboration within the primary health care sector, Scottish local health care cooperatives promoting co-operation within and between the primary and community care sectors, and English primary care trusts enhancing collaboration between the primary care sector and the secondary, community and social care sectors.
Developing primary health care has been the centrepiece of the Labour government's reforms of the National Health Service in Scotland. This has been founded on the belief that an effective and efficient system of primary health care depends on general practitioners and the general practice team working closely together with community nurses, midwives and other therapists to provide a comprehensive package of services to patients. In order to overcome boundaries between community care and primary care, this partnership model has been supported by the development of a new organisational structure in Scotland, the local health care co-operative (Secretary of State for Health, 1997) .
The establishment of local health care cooperatives represents a move away from the market culture that characterised the experience with general practitioner fundholding in the National Health Service to a more collaborative approach, where co-operatives are responsible for delivering health care to and improving the health of local communities of between 25,000 and 150,000 people. The establishment of these co-operatives is an attempt to create a sense of local ownership and control within the general practice community. General practitioners and other health care professionals take responsibility for shaping plans that reflect the specific health needs and clinical priorities of the local community as well as implementing national policy as embodied, for instance, in the Scottish Health Plan (Scottish Executive, 2000) .
The development and operation of local health care co-operatives has been flexible to suit local circumstances. As a consequence, different local models of health care provision have emerged across the country that are shaped by geography, local patterns of service use, and the extent to which general practitioners and other health care professionals were already involved in collaborative working. This is appropriate if these models reflect local priorities, although it may also create inequalities. The aim of this paper is to report on how Scottish local health care co-operatives have developed during their first year of operation by assessing their performance in managing the process of organisational change, stimulating involvement of practices in the co-operative, developing primary care and working in partnership. The experience of Scottish local health care co-operatives may provide lessons to other countries that wish to introduce or strengthen partnerships in primary care.
Scottish Local Health Care Co-operatives
As of 1 st April 1999, local health care co-operatives, which are grouped around general practices were introduced in Scotland. As of 1 st May 2000, 42 Scottish general practices had not joined a cooperative, while the 901 participating practices were grouped in 79 co-operatives. Each cooperative comprised an average of 12 general practices, 47 general practitioners and 59,000 people (see Table 1 ). The Table also illustrates the wide variation among co-operatives in terms of size, proportion of single-handed practices, ex- a The Arbuthnott index is a composite indicator of population morbidity and deprivation based on the standardised mortality rate among people under the age of 65 years; the unemployment rate; the proportion of elderly people claiming income support; and the number of households with two or more indicators of deprivation out of a total of six indicators (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2000) . fundholders, and training practices. This implies that co-operatives have started from very different baselines, with some having to deal with the effects of rurality, morbidity, and deprivation while trying to carry out their functions effectively. Figure 1 situates local health care co-operatives in the organisational structure of the National Health Service in Scotland at the time the study was conducted in 2000. Co-operatives do not constitute separate legal entities, but operate within the governance and accountability framework of a primary care trust. The primary care trust is responsible for providing community services, mental health services, services for people with disabilities, continuing care of elderly people as well as primary care services based in the general practice. The primary care trust itself is accountable to the health board, which is in charge of planning, commissioning, and managing the provision of health care services at regional level.
To date, there is little empirical evidence about whether or not local health care co-operatives are delivering tangible benefits to their patients. In May 2000, the Local Health Care Co-operative Best Practice Group was created, which identified and disseminated examples of good practice in relation to partnership working and service improvement. In its evaluation of local health care co-operatives, the Best Practice Group reported that co-operatives were delivering a wide range of primary and community health care services, and had strengthened cross-sectoral working with local authorities and the voluntary sector (Local Health Care Co-operative Best Practice Group, 2001) .
The current reform agenda in Scotland foresees the introduction of a new type of organisation, the community health partnership, which emphasises the central role of primary care teams, working in new ways with hospital services and, at the community level, with local authorities (Scottish Executive, 2003) . Community health partnerships are expected to be more accountable to local communities, to better match social work services and to be better able to represent local interests within the National Health Service in Scotland.
Partnerships in Primary Care
The establishment of partnerships in primary care represents a shift away from a more marketoriented approach. The neo-classical conception of the market is a governance structure where transactions take place at "arms length" on the basis of complete information and prices (Exworthy et al., 1999) . During the 1990s, the National Health Service exhibited a number of features of a quasimarket as witnessed by the separation of purchasing and providing responsibilities, the devolution of budgetary authority, the establishment of formal contractual relationships, and the pursuit of provider competition. By introducing market traits in the health care system, accountability and efficiency were expected to be enhanced. However, market imperfections and difficulties in specifying contracts can lead to a more collaborative approach, which may take the form of hierarchies or networks. Hierarchies combine separate firms under a single authority, facilitating the establishment of bureaucratic routines (Machado Burns, 1998) . During the first part of its history, the National Health Service exemplified a top-down bureaucratic hierarchy based on a relatively rigid command-and-control planning model. Harrison (1993) cited decisions about investment, pay awards and staffing levels, which had to be referred from local to regional or national levels, as evidence of the hierarchy in practice.
Networks are clusters of mutually dependent firms connected to each other by informal exchange relationships (Roger & Whetten, 1982; Alexander, 1995) . Network actors share norms, acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals (Marsden, 2003) . Coordination is achieved through informal negotiation and social interaction based on trust and reciprocity. Since 1997, the establishment of partnerships in primary care in the National Health Service is founded in the network model. Although some market traits have been retained, more emphasis is now being placed on relational forms of contracting involving longer-term co-operative service agreements (National Health Service Executive, 1997).
In the absence any guidelines on the development and operation of local health care co-operatives, co-operatives exhibit characteristics of multiple governance structures. Co-operatives generally have a constitution and governing bodies for joint decision-making, thereby borrowing elements from hierarchies. However, they also exhibit features that are more associated with markets. Local health care co-operatives are groups of independent contractors. They do not constitute separate legal entities, but operate within the governance and accountability framework of the primary care trust. Additionally, participating practices have no formal line management relationship with management bodies. Partnership in primary care necessitates incentive alignment, but also some degree of value congruence amongst actors. Shared values and norms across general practitioners and other health care professionals, and identification with the goals of the co-operative (Simon, 1991) may be based on the notion of "clans" and socialisation as the principal form of control (Ouchi, 1980) . This resembles co-ordination mechanisms more often associated with networks.
Methods
To assess the progress that local health care cooperatives had made during their first year of operation, a nationwide, anonymous postal questionnaire survey of co-operatives was undertaken. A first questionnaire was sent to the general manager of each local health care cooperative in Scotland. Data were collected on the extent to which general practitioners, and other health and social care professionals worked together within a co-operative. To identify the reasons why general practices had joined a local health care co-operative, a second survey of 901 participating general practices was conducted. A third questionnaire sent to 42 non-participating practices elicited reasons for not joining and concerns about local health care co-operatives. Responses to questions were measured using Likert scales.
Each questionnaire was piloted using an iterative approach, where a sample of respondents was asked to discuss the relevance of questions, to comment on their wording and interpretation, and to check whether all potential answers were included (face and content validity). Ambiguous questions or answers were subsequently deleted or rewritten for greater clarity. The revised questionnaire was then forwarded to another sample of respondents. If it was felt that only marginal corrections were being proposed, no further questionnaires were sent out for piloting.
The decision to conduct a survey of local health care co-operatives entails that data reflected subjective measures. This is a valuable perspective in the absence of routinely collected data. Moreover, subjective measures give us an insight into the opinion and attitude of respondents to co-operatives. However, the following two issues should be borne in mind when using subjective measures. The results are self-reported and, therefore, may not correspond to what is actually happening. Additionally, although respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire from the perspective of their local health care cooperative or general practice and to consult with their colleagues if necessary, the results may be biased towards the respondents' personal views. However, the findings are representative of the range of views across co-operatives, participating and non-participating practices.
Results

Response rates
The three questionnaires were sent to respondents in Autumn 2000. A reminder was sent two weeks later. After two months, the response rates were 35% for the survey of general managers, 34% for the survey of participating practices, and 45% for the survey of non-participating practices, based on those questionnaires that had been returned and completed.
Although these response rates may seem disappointing, it is not uncommon for surveys of primary care providers to generate response rates between 20% and 50% (Templeton et al., 1997) . Moreover, a number of actions were undertaken which have been shown to increase response rates (Edwards et al., 2002) : the length of questionnaires was limited, a personalised cover letter accompanied questionnaires, the survey was endorsed by the Scottish Executive Health Department and the University of Aberdeen, a stamped return envelope was included, and nonrespondents were sent a second questionnaire. Additionally, a follow-up of non-respondents indicated that time constraints were responsible for the decision not to complete the questionnaire rather than the fact that non-respondents may have had a different attitude towards local health care co-operatives than respondents.
Involvement in a local health care cooperative General practices were free to join a local health care co-operative and to determine to what extent they wished to collaborate with other practices within a co-operative.
Optional membership of local health care cooperatives implies that participating practices may not represent a random sample of the population of general practices. This, in turn, raises concerns about selection bias and a two-tier service. A comparison of the characteristics of participating and non-participating practices indicated that cooperatives may actually serve to reduce rather than exacerbate inequities between general practices. General practices located in deprived areas and covering populations with high levels of morbidity exhibited a higher propensity to join a co-operative. General practices finding it difficult to get access to local authority residential care homes were more likely to join a co-operative. This suggests that those general practices with the highest need may have a higher probability of joining a co-operative in order to take advantage of some of its benefits. However, in order to determine whether the introduction of local health care co-operatives may create a two-tier service, further research is needed to investigate whether there are any differences in access to and utilisation of medical services by patients from general practices that have joined a co-operative and patients from non-participating practices, irrespective of need.
Although there were no explicit financial incentives to join a local health care co-operative, the majority of Scottish general practices had joined. This suggests that other, non-financial motives played a major role in the membership decision, although these differed between participating and nonparticipating practices. Participating practices cited reasons concerned with mutual co-operation and the improvement of patient care, whereas nonparticipating practices would join for self-interested reasons concerned with their own practice. This was also mirrored in the type of activities general practices thought co-operatives should be conducting. Participating practices were more likely to support activities concerned with co-operation, whereas nonparticipating practices again cited activities that were more likely to benefit their own practice.
This seems to suggest that communication of the benefits of membership is crucial to introducing or strengthening local health care co-operatives. Making general practitioners feel part of a larger supportive organisation is as important as clearly articulating the benefits of membership for general practitioners themselves and for their own patients.
The extent to which participating practices worked together within a local health care cooperative varied considerably. Some co-operatives turned out to be more active in initiating clinical projects, developing health care services, sharing clinical skills and developing collaboration with external stakeholders than others. The extent of collaboration within the co-operative was correlated across general practices belonging to the same co-operative, with practice-level factors playing little part. This appears to indicate that the impetus for integration is coming from the cooperative itself, rather than from participating practices. It seems to imply that policy needs to focus on strengthening the organisation and management of co-operatives to stimulate collaboration between participating practices. Additionally, general managers argued that efforts to assimilate staff with the new organization and to provide the necessary financial and other support functions turned out to be necessary conditions before co-operatives could move on to promote collaboration between stakeholders in subsequent stages of their development.
Organisational and management structure
During their first year of operation, local health care co-operatives have focused on putting an organisational structure in place. The organisational structure of 67% of co-operatives consisted of a core group (responsible for strategic management) and a management team (responsible for operational management). Thirty per cent of cooperatives were governed by an executive group only. Responsibilities of management bodies mainly related to implementing the development plan of the co-operative, liaising with participating practices and other agencies (hospitals, social work), developing services, and carrying out support functions (e.g., finance, human resources, infrastructure). A minority of co-operatives adopted a locality approach, where groups of general practices existed within the co-operative, each group with their own locality manager.
To support their organizational and management structure, local health care co-operatives received an average management allowance of £166,613, with a minimum of £22,000 and a maximum of £400,000. Management expenditure per capita ranged from £1.14 to £5.14, with an average of £2.97. This was comparable with management expenditure per capita of other types of partnerships in primary care such as first-wave total purchasing pilots (average of £3.12, adjusted to 2000/2001 prices) and second-wave total purchasing pilots (average of £2.65, adjusted to 2000/2001 prices Posnett et al., 1998) .
The level of the management allowance per capita was not related in any systematic way to population and practice characteristics. For instance, the management allowance per capita was not affected by rurality or population morbidity and deprivation. This suggests that co-operatives with the greatest need do not necessarily get more resources to cater for their patient population, suggesting vertical inequity between co-operatives. The overall absence of any relationship between the management allowance per capita and population and practice characteristics points towards a lack of consistency in the process by which the management allowance is negotiated between the primary care trust and the cooperative. To date, no guidance has been issued with respect to supporting the running costs of co-operatives. Moreover, the required level of investment in management is not known.
In the future, local health care co-operatives may devolve some managerial responsibilities to general practitioners in addition to the clinical function of general practitioners. However, practitioners in both participating and non-participating practices were concerned that increased managerial responsibilities would raise their workload and prevent them from spending time with patients. Non-participating practices indicated that more management support from the primary care trust and/or health board would be welcomed.
Primary care development
Primary care development was one of the key objectives of participating practices, and local health care co-operatives had initiated a wide range of primary care activities. Co-operatives actively supported the development of the primary health care team, the co-ordination of services and expertise, and the exchange of data (see Table 2 ). They were also involved in projects relating to heart disease, diabetes, mental health in primary care, and care of the elderly (see Table 3 ).
Eighty per cent of general practices had joined a co-operative to take responsibility for primary care development. A high proportion of participating practices agreed with activities related to primary care development, such as the development of the primary care team (92%), the provision of existing clinical services in the general practice (91%), and co-operation among participating practices in disease areas (89%).
Internal governance
The governance structure that was used internally by local health care co-operatives to co-ordinate the activities of participating practices was assessed in terms of the development of clinical governance, prescribing activities, budget management, and implementation of financial incentives at practice level.
Clinical governance generally was in the early stages of development, with few co-operatives having completed any work. Co-operatives supported the development of practice accreditation, pathways of care and service models, and the review of critical incidents. Workgroups on clinical governance existed in 66% of cooperatives. Clinical governance was the most frequently mentioned responsibility of management bodies. Although co-operatives were in the process of implementing a system of clinical governance, participating and non-participating practices seemed to be reluctant to embrace this as clinical governance was the least supported activity of cooperatives. Findings on objections to co-operatives showed that this may be because general practitioners experienced co-operatives and thus clinical governance as a potential threat to practice and clinical autonomy. This may point to a conflict between the views of general practices and the Government's rationale for setting up co-operatives.
One of the main challenges facing co-operatives is to improve the quality and standards of clinical care within the constraints of a fixed budget. Prescribing funds had been fully devolved in 57% of co-operatives. Fifty-four per cent of co-operatives had set up a workgroup related to prescribing. Work was under way or had been completed on promoting the exchange of prescribing data and the development of a prescribing policy in 89% and 61% of co-operatives, respectively.
Local health care co-operatives have the right to hold a budget that comprises some or all of the following: general medical services cash-limited funds, prescribing funds, a budget for communitybased clinical services, and a community hospital budget (National Health Service Management Executive, 1999) . During the first year of operation, 76% of these budgets had been delegated from the primary care trust to the co-operative. However, participating practices did not support budgetary devolution to individual practices and the introduction of incentive schemes. Sixty-eight per cent of co-operatives indicated that they would not consider setting budgets for individual practices or would only develop it in the future. Although 71% of participating practices disagreed with the need to share savings with other practices, seventysix percent of co-operatives had started implementing arrangements to deal with savings made by participating practices.
Local health care co-operatives do not hold a budget to commission secondary care from hospitals. Participating and non-participating practices had different views about the absence of purchasing power. Seventy-nine per cent of participating practices objected to the inability of co-operatives to commission acute services. Thirtyseven per cent of non-participating practices attached no importance to the lack of purchasing power. The ability to commission acute services would not increase the prospect of future participation for 50% of non-participating practices.
Partnerships
Local health care co-operatives were developing closer relationships with other health care professionals and providers of social services through representation on their management bodies and workgroups, and actual co-operation with these providers.
Partnership with other health care providers was an important motive for membership of a cooperative. Eighty and fifty-four per cent of participating practices reported that they had joined a co-operative to work in collaboration with other health care professionals (e.g., other general practitioners, community nurses, dentists, pharmacists, opticians) and to enhance the dialogue with providers of social services, respectively.
The management bodies of co-operatives relied on the commitment of members of participating practices, nurses, and other health care professionals (e.g., pharmacists [see Table 4 ]). The inclusion of mental health service representatives, local health council representatives, voluntary service representatives and lay representatives was marginal, even though work with social services had progressed the farthest. This implies that stakeholder representation was not socially inclusive during the first year of co-operatives.
Collaborative working was most likely to have developed between co-operatives on the one hand and the social work department, community hospitals, primary care trust, participating practices, and other co-operatives on the other hand (see Table 5 ). Less progress had been made in terms of co-operation with the general public, acute care sector, education and housing services. This shows that co-operatives do not work in isolation and that boundaries between care settings are being breached. This may enable co-operatives to inform the planning and delivery of care across the whole system (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001). However, attempts to engage patients and local communities need to be stepped up in order to increase responsiveness and accountability to local health care users.
Discussion
Local health care co-operatives have made considerable progress within their first 12 months of operation. They have successfully managed the process of establishing themselves as new organisations and have started to develop primary care services in collaboration with other health care providers. However, some organisational and cultural barriers still need to be overcome if cooperatives are to contribute towards the key themes of the Scottish Health Plan (Scottish Executive, 2000) such as improving health, involving people, working in partnership, and developing services. When discussing these findings, parallels are drawn with partnerships in primary care in other countries to examine how differences in the objectives and role of various models of partnerships have shaped divergence in their organisation and development.
Local health care co-operatives have forged themselves as health improvement organisations that have started to develop primary and community care services, and have gone some way to stimulating co-operation within the National Health Service in Scotland. This is not surprising given that the main objectives of co-operatives are to develop extended primary care teams that are able to develop population-wide approaches to health improvement and disease prevention (Secretary of State for Health, 1997a) . This contrasts with the more narrow focus of Australian divisions of general practice, with a body reviewing their role stating that divisions focused on helping general practitioners with their practices and patients at the expense of addressing broader primary health care needs of their communities (Phillips et al., 2003) . As a consequence, it was recommended that divisions put more emphasis on a community orientation and a multi-disciplinary approach.
General practices have started to work together within local health care co-operatives, although this was inhibited by the lack of time that general practitioners can contribute to the co-operative. Collaboration with external stakeholders such as local authorities, social services and the public was at an embryonic stage. Previous research indicates that this reflects the experience of English primary care trusts (Wilkin et al., 1999 (Wilkin et al., , 2002 . In Australia, the boards of divisions of general practice were found to be dominated by general practitioners, with the review body recommending increased collaboration within the primary health care sector and with other sectors (Phillips et al., 2003) . On the other hand, reflecting the emphasis on partnership and community focus in Wales, local health groups had a wider representation of general practices, other health care professionals, social services departments, and voluntary organisations in their governing bodies, but had made less progress in developing primary care services (Audit Commission, 2000) .
Strong management has been fundamental to the success of local health care co-operatives in encouraging co-operation and working together. However, the development of management capacity was inhibited by constraints on budgets for management. In the future, the management function may be further delegated within cooperatives, with general practices taking up more responsibility over resources and budgets. Whereas budgets had generally not been delegated from the level of the co-operative to individual practices in Scotland, previous studies have shown that some English primary care trusts have devolved budgets and introduced financial incentives at practice level (Wilkin et al., 1999 (Wilkin et al., , 2002 .
To develop the management function, local health care co-operatives have sometimes shared support functions with their primary care trust or neighbouring co-operatives. In contrast with English primary care trusts, this did not yet lead to reconfigurations or mergers of co-operatives. However, it is not clear what the most efficient size of a local health care co-operative is. Most empirical studies of partnerships in primary care have concluded that size does not matter in terms of costs or benefits to patients (Bojke et al., 2001) . If local health care co-operatives are to be merged, then this should be done cautiously and with careful analysis of the effects.
Local health care co-operatives were heralded as a way of putting primary and community care professionals in the driving seat to develop services that meet local health needs and clinical priorities. However, local ownership and autonomy have been inhibited by centralized policy and decisionmaking. An example of this was the introduction of the Performance Management Framework in Scotland in 2001. This involves a myriad of indicators within seven dimensions of performance, the three most important of which relate to waiting times, financial accountability and winter pressures.
One of the main problems with this framework is the lack of systems of performance management and incentives at the level of the co-operative. What rewards are there for "good" performance and what penalties exist for "poor" performance? "In particular, it is unclear how local health care cooperatives and primary care providers" performance is being managed. Clinical governance is playing a role, but is not popular with general practitioners. In order to develop clinical governance without alienating general practices, the process of introducing clinical governance needs to be seen less as an external "top down" monitoring exercise, and more of a grass roots concern about increasing the quality of care for patients. On the other hand, the introduction of a national performance system based on key performance indicators was proposed in Australia to achieve continuing improvement in the performance of divisions of general practice (Phillips et al., 2003) . Under this system, "good" performance of divisions would lead to additional funding and reduced reporting requirements.
Local health care co-operatives are playing a crucial role in the provision of primary care services in Scotland. However, there is a danger that continuing reforms in Scotland may not give cooperatives sufficient time to demonstrate whether they are able to deliver tangible benefits to patients. Even though the current reform agenda in Scotland emphasises further integration of primary and secondary care and of primary and community care in community health partnerships, there is very little good quality evidence that this is the right thing to do. The "right" amount and level of integration are not known. What are the costs and benefits of integration for patients, professionals and the National Health Service? Evaluation and experimentation is crucial in ensuring that any changes in the structure benefit patients and improve their care.
